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Supplying Choice: An Analysis of School Participation Decisions in 
Voucher Programs in DC, Indiana, and Louisiana 
 
Abstract 
Since school voucher funds are public, policymakers fiercely debate how those funds should be 
spent. A goal of many decision-makers is to ensure that every private school option is “high-
quality” through program accountability regulations. Private schools, however, have a say in the 
matter. They can decide whether or not to participate in a private school choice program and 
likely factor the type and level of program regulations into that decision.  
We examine the impacts of private school regulations on the supply-side of voucher 
programs in D.C., Indiana, and Louisiana. Private schools value their autonomy. Therefore, we 
expect that regulatory burden will be negatively associated with the quality of schools that 
choose to participate in a choice program. Independent private schools that accept substantial 
regulation from the state are likely to be financially distressed and more willing to change their 
educational model in exchange for access to voucher-funded students. 
We employ a linear probability model to examine how school quality, as measured by 
tuition-level and Great School Review scores, is associated with program participation for 
schools. Our results largely confirm our hypothesis that higher tuition levels and larger cohort 
enrollments, conditions normally associated with high quality schools, identify schools that are 
less likely to participate in voucher programs. We also find a consistent negative relationship 
between Great Schools Review score and the school participation decision, indicating lower 
quality schools have a higher tendency of participating in voucher programs in all three states, 





private schools in D.C. and Louisiana, the two states that have higher regulatory burdens, are less 
likely to participate in voucher programs.  
 
Keywords: private school, school vouchers, participating school, decision-making model, school 






Supplying Choice: An Analysis of School Participation Decisions in 
Voucher Programs in DC, Indiana, and Louisiana 
 
1．  Introduction 
Private school choice programs have proliferated across the United States since the 1990’s 
(EdChoice, 2017). They include three different designs for supporting access to private 
schooling: school vouchers, tax-credit scholarships, and Education Savings Accounts. From the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice (pilot) Program, which served 341 students in 19901, to the Florida 
Tax-Credit Scholarship Program, which enrolled almost 100,000 students in the spring of 20172, 
private school choice programs have been considered a policy solution that addresses educational 
quality and equity concerns by introducing competitive pressures, funding individual students 
rather than schools, and empowering families to control their child’s educational experience 
(Friedman, 1955).  
The core hypothesis behind private school choice is that market-oriented programs will 
have positive effects on student achievement by a) providing more opportunities for students to 
attend high quality private schools, and b) allowing parents to choose the schools that best fit 
their children’s particular needs. The underlying assumption that the average quality of the 
private schools that accept voucher students would exceed the average of all the local public 
schools, and those private schools would be more effective in improving student learning, 
however, is uncertain. Systematic reviews of the participant effects of private school choice on 
student test scores suggest that effects tend to be positive but also small and inconsistent, 
especially in the U.S. (e.g. Shakeel, Anderson & Wolf, 2016; Epple, Romano & Urquiola, 2015). 
																																																						
1 ED.C.hoice: Wisconsin – Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, available at https://www.eD.C.hoice.org/school-
choice/programs/wisconsin-milwaukee-parental-choice-program/. 






The answer to the question of what effect school choice has on student test scores tends to be: “It 
depends.” One factor it likely depends upon is the supply of choice schools.  
Most empirical studies of private school choice programs have focused on demand side 
considerations of student achievement and parent preferences. Only a few choice studies have 
considered the supply side: the schools receiving voucher students (e.g. McShane, 2015). The 
studies of participating choice schools that do exist are merely descriptive and not analytical. As 
a result, little attention has been paid to the supply side of voucher programs; specifically, the 
supply of schools under differing regulatory environments. The public, scholars, and 
policymakers have little systematic knowledge regarding what kinds of schools participate in 
voucher programs, why they do so, and what the implications might be for student achievement.  
This report remedies this shortcoming in the literature by analyzing what school 
characteristics predict participation in private school voucher programs in multiple states. 
Specifically, we estimate the key factors that drive schools’ choices to participate based on cross-
sectional data from the 2014-15 school year from the private school voucher programs in the 
District of Columbia (D.C.), Louisiana, and Indiana. Our report shows that schools with lower 
tuition, smaller enrollment, and higher minority-density student populations tend to be more 
likely to participate in voucher programs. Schools with those features normally are considered 
“low quality” schools. All else equal, private schools with religious affiliations are more likely to 
participate in voucher programs. 
This report makes substantial contributions to both the scholarly and practitioner fields. A 
better understanding of the supply side of voucher programs will help new and existing school 





provides scholars and policymakers with a new approach to understanding how voucher program 
effects are mediated by the quality of schools induced to participate. 
2．Prior Studies of School Voucher Programs in the U.S. 
Hundreds of evaluations have assessed the effect of school choice on various outcomes. 
School voucher, tax-credit scholarship, and Education Savings Account (ESA) programs, all of 
which provide public subsidies to families that allow them to choose a private school for their 
child, have proliferated across the country over the past few decades. Currently, 52 such 
programs have been enacted in 28 states plus the District of Columbia (EdChoice, 2017).  
Dozens of empirical studies focus on the impact of private school choice on student 
outcomes as defined by student test scores, attainment and college enrollment (e.g. Cowen et al., 
2013; Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1999; Howell et al., 2002; Rouse, 1998; Witte et al., 2014; Wolf 
et al., 2013). A recent meta-analysis finds that choice programs tend to have positive and 
statistically significant test score effects, especially in math, when they are publicly funded, and 
when they take place outside of the U.S. (Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf, 2016). Other, less 
comprehensive, reviews of the test score effects of school choice (e.g. Epple, Romano & 
Urquiola, 2015; Rouse & Barrow, 2008; Wolf, 2008) conclude that results tilt positive but only 
most clearly for African American students. These reviews all agree that the size and statistical 
significance of school voucher impacts on test scores vary substantially from place to place, 
suggesting that the kinds of private schools that compose a given voucher program influence its 
effects on students.  
Frederick Hess (2010) argues that school choice programs have filled seats in existing 
private schools but have failed to entice new high quality private schools to open. Similarly, John 





educational market will fail to provide parents with abundant high quality choices. In Michael 
McShane’s edited book New and Better Schools: the Supply Side of School Choice (2015), 
private school choice researchers and practitioners summarize the challenges that choice 
programs face in creating marketplaces to drive improvement in the education sector. The twelve 
chapters provide a broad discussion of how to improve the scale and quality of the supply of 
private schools participating in choice programs; however, they are mostly suggestive and 
theoretical, failing to provide robust solutions to enhance the supply side of private school choice 
programs. In particular, the literature does not describe the characteristics of participating 
institutions, how the participating schools are different from their non-participating counterparts, 
and why specific schools choose to participate in voucher programs. 
Some empirical studies fill this gap by providing descriptive information about the types 
of private schools that decide to participate in school voucher programs. Religiosity plays an 
important role in enrolling choice students. By 2011, 107 private schools served voucher 
students in Milwaukee, with 86 percent of them ascribing to one of 10 different religious 
affiliations (McShane et al., 2012). Moreover, Catholic schools enroll a majority of voucher 
students in most voucher programs (Wolf et al., 2010; Austin, 2015). Howell et al. (2006) find 
that urban voucher-receiving private schools tend to have small class sizes, minimal facilities, 
and few special programs for disadvantaged students. Austin (2015) reports that participating 
schools in the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program (ICSP) have larger enrollments than non-
participating schools. Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Walters (2015) find that lower quality private 
schools, as measured by declining enrollment and lower tuition rates, are more likely to 





Private schools with longer experience participating in a voucher program are more likely 
to offer special programs for struggling students (Stewart, Jacob, & Jensen, 2012). Ford (2011) 
analyzes the exit patterns of private schools from the MPCP, finding that the schools with lower 
enrollment growth rates are more likely to leave. His follow-up study of Milwaukee voucher 
schools reports that schools experiencing enrollment growth had significantly higher proportions 
of students achieve proficiency than the schools that experienced enrollment declines, suggesting 
that private institutions with higher quality tend to attract larger enrollments compared to lower-
performing schools. This advantage fades out, however, after controlling for the descriptive 
characteristics of schools such as years in the program, proportion of the student body made up 
of voucher students, and religious affiliation (Ford, 2016). 
A small number of studies have examined potential barriers to school participation in 
school choice programs. A recent survey of leaders at participating and non-participating private 
schools in Louisiana, Indiana, and Florida suggests that program regulation is a major concern 
(Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015). Twenty-six percent of the leaders of non-participating 
private schools in Florida, 62 percent of them in Indiana, and 64 percent of them in Louisiana 
listed “Future regulation that might come with participation” as their major reason for not 
participating in the program (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015, 17-19). These responses 
suggest that private schools are highly sensitive to regulatory creep in making participation 
decisions regarding school choice programs. Stuit and Doan (2013) generate regulatory burden 
scores for the private school choice programs in the U.S. They find that private school 
participation rates are lower in more regulated school choice programs. Egalite (2015) suggests 
that revenue constraints, shortages of facility space, and state regulations are the major concerns 





The school voucher research base is a tale of two literatures. The empirical research on 
the effects of voucher programs on student outcomes is broad, deep, rigorous and causal. The 
empirical research on what kinds of schools participate in school voucher programs is relatively 
thin and descriptive. Since the private schools in a voucher program are, to a significant extent, 
the program itself, the lack of analyses of school participation in private school choice programs 
is a hole that cries to be filled. We take a step in that direction by examining school participation 
in three private school voucher programs that operate under different policy contexts. 
3．Theory and Hypothesis 
Studies examining the effectiveness of private school choice programs are static in that 
they examine initiatives as they exist. While that approach is sound from a program evaluation 
standpoint, since a school choice program is what it is, these studies may underestimate the 
potential effects choice has on students since individual schools choose whether to participate in 
voucher programs. We customize a decision-making model for the specific case of private 
schools participating in a voucher program by considering the benefit of additional funding and 
the costs tied to state-driven regulation. 
Benefits of Participating in Voucher Programs 
Intuitively, the most obvious economic benefit for schools participating in choice 
programs is to acquire additional resources by receiving voucher students. Of course, financial 
benefits will vary across schools based on their specific cost structures and capacities. The 
further a given school’s enrollment is from full capacity, the lower the marginal cost is for 
accepting an additional student. To the degree that marginal cost exceeds zero, the incentive for 
an institution to participate is the voucher amount minus the average cost per student. Almost all 





full capacity and have tuition levels at or below the voucher amount. Other than receiving 
voucher-based revenue, we expect that schools will achieve greater economies of scale by 
participating in a voucher program, even when the maximum voucher amount does not fully 
cover the average cost of educating a student at that school.  
Furthermore, private schools may still elect to participate in voucher programs even if 
they lose money on each student, since the schools gain the nonfinancial benefit of social 
responsibility or what organizational theorists call “purposive benefits” (Wilson, 1989). We 
suspect that religious schools value social responsibility more than secular ones.  
Costs of Participating in Voucher Programs 
There are two types of costs for schools participating in voucher programs. Participating 
schools must provide tuition subsidies when per-pupil costs exceed the state-determined voucher 
amount, as few voucher programs allow schools to charge families top-up fees above the 
voucher maximum. Thus, schools with higher per-pupil costs have a financial incentive not to 
participate in voucher programs. The other type of cost is the additional regulatory burden. Many 
voucher programs require private schools to administer state standardized tests, undergo 
financial audits, surrender admissions policies to the state, and conform to teacher certification 
standards. Complying with these requirements costs money. 
Regulatory burdens will have an absolute cost and a relative cost for private schools 
within the same location. Each voucher program has a consistent set of regulations that apply to 
all private schools within the program’s geographic reach. In that sense, the costs of compliance 
are absolute and only vary across programs. In another sense, the costs of compliance are relative 
and vary for individual schools within a given location. Schools that are vastly different from the 





adjustments. For example, if an institution’s educational model did not rely on standardized tests 
before, switching into a voucher program that requires standardized testing would be relatively 
more costly than it would be for a private school used to testing its students.  
School Participation Decision Making Model 
As shown in Figure 1, schools make their participation decision by comparing the 
additional costs of tuition subsidization and regulatory compliance associated with participating 
with the additional benefits of voucher revenue, economies of scale and enhanced social 
responsibility. Theoretically, schools perceiving benefits exceeding the costs will decide to 
participate in voucher programs. These schools likely have a lower tuition level and a smaller 
enrollment size, or are eager for financial support and are willing to sacrifice some school 
autonomy for additional funding. The private schools that meet those criteria are likely to be 
lower-quality academically (Stewart, Jacob & Jensen, 2012). They also are more likely to be 
religious with an explicit mission to serve disadvantaged students, no matter the cost. 
Our theoretical model results in three hypotheses regarding the school voucher 
participation decision. All else equal: 
1. Schools with higher quality will be less likely to participate; 
2. Catholic schools will be more likely to participate; 
3. Schools will be less likely to participate in more highly-regulated programs; 
4．Descriptions of Programs 
We focus on three school voucher programs: the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, 





DC Opportunity Scholarship Program 
The D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC OSP) was established in January 2004 
as the first federally-funded school choice program in the United States. Students must live in 
D.C. in families that receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistant Program (SNAP) benefits or be at 
or below 185 percent of the poverty line ($44,955 for a family of four in 2016-17). Students are 
given priority in receiving a scholarship if they have a sibling in the program or come from low- 
quality public school. 
The average voucher amount is $8,452 for K-8 students and $12,679 for high school 
students. Even the higher voucher amount for high school is only about 47 percent of the per 
pupil funding amount in D.C. public schools. In 2016-17, 1,166 students and 42 private schools 
participated in the program. The average voucher value in 2016-17 is projected to be $9,472. In 
order to participate in the DC OSP, private schools must require that teachers in core subjects 
hold a bachelor’s degree. They also must administer a nationally norm-referenced exam to their 
voucher students.  
The initial gold-standard experimental evaluation of the OSP mandated by Congress 
concluded that participation in the program led to significantly higher graduation rates (Wolf et 
al., 2013). An evaluation of the cost effectiveness of the DC OSP found a benefit to cost ratio of 
2.62, indicating that each dollar spent on the program produced 2.62 dollars in benefits (Wolf & 
McShane, 2013). On the other hand, a follow-up experimental evaluation of the program 
reported that student test scores in math were lower one year after receiving an Opportunity 





Indiana Choice Scholarship Program 
The Indiana Choice Scholarship Program (ICSP) started in 2011 and is now the largest 
school voucher program in the country. In order to qualify for the program, students must come 
from a family that earns no more than 150 percent of the federal lunch program limit ($67,433 
for a family of four in the 2016-17 school year). Students must be assigned to or be leaving a 
public school with an "F" grade. If a student comes from a family that earns up to 200 percent of 
the federal lunch program amount ($89,910 for a family of four in 2016-17), they qualify for the 
program if they have a disability or if they received a voucher in the previous school year. 
In 2016-17, 313 schools and 34,299 students participated in the program. The average 
voucher value was $4,024 in 2015-16 (less than half of the per pupil spending in public schools). 
The ICSP is the most accessible program in our study, as 54 percent of students across the state 
are income-eligible. 
In order to participate in the program, schools must report their graduation rates and 
ratings based on the Indiana Statewide Testing for Educational Progress (ISTEP). If they are 
rated a "D" or "F" for two years in a row, they are no longer eligible for the program. Schools 
must administer the state tests, submit financial reporting and allow the state to have full access 
to their property in order to observe classrooms. Administering the state test is customary for 
most private schools in Indiana because the Hoosier State requires state testing for any school, 
public or private, that wishes to participate in interscholastic extracurricular activities including 
sports. 
Louisiana Scholarship Program 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) started as a pilot program in New Orleans in 





line ($60,750 for a family of four in 2016-17) in order to qualify for the program. Students must 
have attended a public school that was graded as a C, D, F, or T in the previous school year. If 
the student is entering kindergarten, they must be assigned to a C, D, F, or T3 school for the 
current school year. During the admission lottery for oversubscribed schools, students at a D or F 
school receive priority over other students. 
The voucher amount is equal to the state share of per pupil funding in the student’s home 
public school district or the private school’s tuition amount, whichever is less. In 2015-16, 7,110 
students and 121 schools participated in the program and the average voucher value was $5,856. 
Twenty percent of the K-12 students in Louisiana were eligible for the program. 
In order to participate in the LSP, private schools must use an open admissions process in 
enrolling scholarship recipients and administer the same state examinations required by the 
public school district. The schools must also maintain a “quality” curriculum that is equal to or 
better than that of public schools, as judged by the state department of education. Private schools 
are prohibited from charging students a top-up above the voucher amount. Failure to comply 
with these requirements can lead to the school’s removal from the program. 
Since the statewide expansion of the program in 2012, there have been several studies of 
it by the School Choice Demonstration Project (SCDP). Mills and Wolf (2017) find that the LSP 
had a negative effect on student math achievement after two years. However, Egalite, Mills, and 
Wolf (2016) report a positive impact of the program on racial integration, especially in public 
schools previously under court orders to integrate. In addition, Egalite (2016) finds some positive 








Further, the program saves money for the state and local school districts (Trivitt & DeAngelis, 
2016). 
Table 1 outlines attributes relevant to the participation decisions for private schools 
within each of the three voucher programs included in this report. In particular, we present the 
financial benefit for participating private schools within each program and the average funding 
relative to the traditional public school funding amount. We also show the various regulatory 
burdens associated with participation: testing, open-admissions, financial reporting, prohibition 
of parental copay, and teacher certification requirements. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
The findings in Table 1 mirror those in the 2014 voucher program scorecard released by 
the Center for Education Reform.4 The scorecard examines the regulatory freedom experienced 
by private schools in voucher programs in 15 locations and found that Indiana had the least 
regulatory burden, scoring an A. Washington D.C. scored a B, while Louisiana scored a C. The 
findings also align at least somewhat with the Stuit and Doan (2013) ranking of regulatory 
burden scores for thirteen of the private school choice programs in the U.S., which rank Indiana 
as least burdensome (ranked 2nd) and D.C. as the most burdensome (ranked 7th) of the three 
programs included in this report. 
Private schools in Louisiana and D.C. face the largest costs for participation, while 
serving voucher students costs private schools in Indiana the least. Thus, we expect a 
significantly lower probability of participating for schools in Louisiana and D.C. after controlling 
for school characteristics. 
																																																						






Specifically, private schools participating in the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship have 
additional requirements of state testing, financial reporting, and, as indicated by the low 
eligibility rate, less-advantaged voucher students. The D.C. voucher program also has additional 
teacher certificate requirements; thus we expect D.C. Catholic schools (which do not require 
certification) are less apt to participate relative to Catholic schools in Indiana and Louisiana.  
Private schools participating in the LSP have additional requirements of state testing, 
open-admissions, financial reporting, prohibition of parental copay, and, as indicated by the low 
eligibility rate, the least-advantaged voucher students. On the other hand, private schools 
participating in the LSP tend to receive slightly more public funding, on average, relative to 
those in D.C. and Indiana. Because high-quality private schools appear to have the most to risk 
in Louisiana, we expect that they will be the least likely to participate in their voucher program.  
Private schools in Indiana appear to have much lower costs tied to their participation 
decision. In particular, they do not have to use an open-admissions process or additional teaching 
requirements, and are allowed to accept parental funds above and beyond the voucher amount. 
Additionally, private schools in Indiana can benefit from a large increase in demand from 
students who are relatively less costly to educate, as indicated by the comparatively high 
eligibility rate of 54 percent. However, private schools in Indiana seem to experience a slightly 
lower financial benefit per student, as indicated by an average voucher value that is only 42 
percent of the public school funding level. Nonetheless, private schools participating in Indiana’s 
voucher program are not compelled to accept the voucher amount as full-payment. Because high-
quality private schools appear to have the least to risk in Indiana, we do not expect quality levels 





The decision makers who shaped these three private school choice programs did not 
operate in a vacuum. State context is important to how choice programs are designed and that 
context varied across D.C., Indiana, and Louisiana. In D.C., President Bush and congressional 
leaders designed the Opportunity Scholarship Program as a pilot project to learn how private 
school choice might affect low-income families in the nation’s capital (Stewart & Wolf, 2014). 
For Indiana, the Choice Scholarship Program was the state’s second private school choice 
program, building on a limited tax-credit scholarship program launched in 2010. Thus, the 
Indiana program represented a policy breakthrough long in the works for Hoosiers (Austin 
2015). 
Louisiana has been home to a large individual tax deduction program since 2008. Up to 
$5,000 in education expenses, including private school tuition, can be deducted from the family’s 
state taxable income. Private schools in Louisiana benefit from the tax deduction policy 
whenever the parents of students attending their school claim the tax deduction, as over 100,000 
families did in 2012, because it makes private school tuition more affordable to middle class 
families (EdChoice 2017). The tax deduction policy does not benefit low-income families in the 
state, however, because they rarely itemize their tax deductions. In enacting the Louisiana 
Scholarship Program, policymakers sought an additional private school choice initiative 
designed specifically and intentionally to serve low-income students whose families did not 
benefit from the tax deduction policy. 
5. Data 
The data used in this report includes participating school lists in three locations for the 
2014-15 school year and school-level characteristics linking to the decision of whether to 





annual report of the voucher program for each state (Indiana Department of Education, 2016; 
Louisiana Department of Education, 2014). According to the reports, 492 K-12 private schools 
received voucher students across the three locations in the 2014-15 school year: 47 in the District 
of Columbia, 314 in Indiana, and 131 in Louisiana.  
Measures of school characteristics were obtained from the publicly available Private 
School Universe Survey (PSS) database for the most recent school year of 2013-2014. The PSS 
is a nation-wide survey of all the private schools in the U.S. conducted every two years since 
1988-89. Information missing from the PSS was collected from lists provided by nationwide 
private school associations, state departments of education, and other sources. In the 2013-14 
survey, 42 D.C. private schools, 329 Indiana private schools5 and 284 private schools in 
Louisiana were included, for a total of 655 private schools. We used information from the 
Private School Review website for 12 DC OSP participating schools that were not included in 
the PSS (2013-14), resulting in 667 schools with information on school characteristics. 
In addition to the PSS, we collected 2015-16 school tuition levels by searching school 
websites and calling the schools, when necessary. We combine the tuition information along 
with the PSS survey data to describe the school characteristics for both voucher participating 
schools and non-participating schools. Descriptive statistics of school characteristics are in Table 
2.  
Program participation rates differed across locations. The rate was 78 percent for D.C., 
70 percent for Indiana, and 33 percent for Louisiana, indicating that private schools in Louisiana 
were particularly unlikely to participate in the LSP.  
																																																						





Lastly, we use data from the Great Schools6 website for our analysis of the relationship 
between parent reviews and program participation. The original scale takes on integer values 
from one to five, with five the most positive. We aggregate a school’s Great Schools Review 
score into a continuous variable that ranges from one to five by weighting it on the frequency of 
parent’s rating on each score. The aggregated Great School Review score has a mean of 4.18 
with the standard deviation of 0.698, indicating a small variation between schools. 
Table 3 describes the quality of the data we use to conduct this study. Overall, the private 
schools that are included in our report represent almost 70 percent of the private school 
population in the three states, indicating a highly representative sample. 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
6.  Methods 
To test our hypotheses, we apply linear probability models to estimate the school’s 
participation choice. At the school level, the participation equation is: 
𝑦! = 𝛽!𝑇𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!+𝛽!𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐! + 𝜌! + 𝜀!  (1) 
The dependent variable of interest, the likelihood that school i participates in a voucher 
program in the year 2014-15 is a function of the amount of the school tuition, average cohort 
enrollment size, religious affiliation, and other school characteristics. We conduct the analyses 
across states and within each state. 
Four independent variables of interest are used separately and in combination in the 
analysis. One set of models disaggregates total revenue into its separate components of tuition 
																																																						





level and enrollment level.7 A second set of models combine school tuition with average cohort 
enrollment to produce a “revenue” variable that represents both the price and quantity of each 
school’s educational service. A third set of models replaces tuition and enrollment with each 
school’s Great Schools review score, using reputation as a proxy for school quality. Since we 
anticipate that schools with higher tuition, larger enrollment, and higher Great Schools review 
scores, those normally considered higher-quality schools, will be less likely to participate in a 
given program, we expect that the coefficient estimates for these explanatory variables will be 
negative, especially in Louisiana and D.C.  
We first present a model that does not use school-level controls, since including them 
would deteriorate our treatment of interest. If tuition levels reflect several school-level 
characteristics, we may not want to include any controls. Theoretically, if everything that the 
family receives is reflected in the price of the school, a model that controls for all school 
characteristics purchased by tuition would perfectly remove the coefficient on tuition level. 
Nevertheless, we also include a model with school-level controls as a robustness check.  
The variable Enrollment describes school i’s average cohort enrollment (in hundreds), 
which may indicate an economies of scale benefit introduced by accepting additional voucher 
students. If enrollment is a measure of consumer demand, it is also a quality variable of interest. 
As we hypothesize schools with smaller enrollment that have lower marginal costs of admitting 
additional voucher students are more likely to participate in the program, we anticipate that 𝛽! 
will also be negative.  
Additionally, the school participation decision is influenced by other control variables 








characteristics that may influence school i’s overall quality and expenses. We control for school 
institutional characteristics, including an indicator of whether school i is an elementary-only 
(below 7th grade), secondary (offering grades between 7 and 12), or combined (all k12 levels). 
We also control for percentage of minority students within a school, whether the school has a 
library or media center, and the average length of a school day.  
Catholic is a binary variable that indicates if school i is a Catholic school. The 
coefficient, 𝛽!, is expected to be positive since religious schools generally show a higher 
willingness to take on social responsibilities. However, we would expect it to be negative for 
OSP, since D.C. has strict requirements on teacher certification which set additional barriers for 
Catholic schools to participate in the program. 
Along with all the variables described above, 𝜌 in the Equation (1) denotes the specific 
program, j, that the school i, was in, and 𝜀 refers to the random errors. At the cross state level, we 
conduct a program fixed effect regression with the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program as the 
default, and would expect a negative sign for the coefficients on the D.C. and Louisiana indicator 
variables, which refers to a lower participating tendency of private schools in those two sites. 
7. Results 
Tuition and Enrollment 
A comparison of means reveals that the tuition levels of participating private schools tend 
to be lower than those that choose not to participate in D.C. and Louisiana; however the 
difference is only statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in Louisiana, 
where participating private schools have tuition levels that are around $800 lower.  
The revenue variable behaves as expected in our main analysis. Higher revenue is 





models that exclude control variables for school amenities but changes to a positive association 
with participation controlling for the school features that revenue buys. None of the coefficients 
on the revenue variable effect are statistically significant.  
Our primary results that solely include tuition and average cohort enrollment as separate 
variables at the cross state level using state and city fixed effects largely confirm our first 
hypothesis, as shown in Column 2, Table 4. We find that schools with higher tuition are less 
likely to choose to participate in voucher programs: a $1,000 increase in school tuition is 
associated with a 0.9 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of participating in a voucher 
program, marginally significant at p<.1. Schools with larger cohort enrollment are also less 
likely to participate in voucher programs, though this association is not statistically significant. 
The effect of tuition fades out after controlling for school characteristics that are related to the 
tuition level, as shown in Column 2 through 8, and the effects of cohort enrollment remain 
negative and insignificant across all the models. Additionally, Column 8 indicates the Catholic 
schools have a higher tendency of participating in voucher programs than non-Catholic schools, 
across all three states, statistically significant at p<.01.  
In the meantime, the coefficients on the state fixed effects of D.C. and Louisiana are 
consistently negative across all the models, and the magnitude of Louisiana is significantly larger 
than D.C., indicating that controlling for school characteristics, private schools in Louisiana and 
D.C., the two states that share larger regulatory burdens, are less likely to participate in voucher 
programs than those in Indiana, with the least participation in Louisiana. These results align with 
our expectation. Comparisons of school participation decision making across states reveal similar 
stories, as shown in Appendix 1.   





Table 5 presents the full linear regression model estimation for each of the states. As a 
result, tuition is negatively associated with school voucher program participation in all three 
states, and attains statistical significance in D.C. and Indiana. Specifically, a $1,000 increase in 
school tuition is predicted to reduce a school’s likelihood of participating in the DC OSP by 1.9 
percentage points (p<.05), and in the ICSP by 3 percentage points (p<.05), all else equal. The 
average cohort enrollment only predicts school participation in the voucher program in 
Louisiana. Controlling for other school characteristics, an increase of 10 students in average 
cohort enrollment reduces a school’s likelihood of participating in the LSP by 2.8 percentage 
points (p<.05).  
Catholic schools in Indiana and Louisiana are 41.1 and 24.2 percentage points, 
respectively, more likely to participate in voucher programs than their non-Catholic counterparts. 
Catholic private schools in D.C. have less likelihood of participating in the DC OSP, though this 
association is not statistically significant at p<.05.  
Lastly, private schools with a higher proportion of minority students are more likely to 
participate in the LSP, statistically significant at p<.01. On the other hand, such schools are less 
likely to participate in the OSP and ICSP, though this association fails to reach statistical 
significance. 
We also adopt probit models with city fixed effects for a robustness check, restricting our 
analytical samples to schools that have counterparts within the same city. Those schools are 
largely the urban and high-tuition schools. The results from probit models are similar to those we 
obtained from the linear probability model in Table 4 and 5 and are reported in Appendix 2. 





Great Schools Review Score 
Great Schools reviews provide a more direct measure of private school quality. We were 
able to obtain scores from 40 schools in D.C., 217 schools in Indiana, and 221 schools in 
Louisiana. Table 6 indicates a potential negative relationship between Great Schools review 
scores and school decisions to participate in a voucher program. The coefficient on the effect of a 
school’s review school and the likelihood of participation is negative in D.C. and Louisiana and 
indicates that a one-unit increase in Great Schools review score is associated with a 12 
percentage point lower likelihood of participating in the LSP and a 5.1 percentage point lower 
likelihood of participating in the DC OSP. In Indiana, the relationship reverses and a one-unit 
increase in Great Schools Review score is associated with a 0.3 percentage point higher tendency 
of participating in the ICSP. However, these effects are not statistically significant. This might be 
due to the small variance of the Great Schools Review score. More than three quarters of schools 
in our sample have a Great School Review score larger than 4, meaning there is little variance in 
the rating and therefore little likelihood of a consistent relationship with the participation 
decision. Results remain similar after controlling for school characteristics. 
State fixed effects indicate that private schools in DC and Louisiana are less likely to 
participate in voucher programs compared to schools in Indiana. Schools in Louisiana, the state 
with highest burden of regulation, have the lowest tendency of participating, with the association 
significant at p<.01. 





8.  Discussion and Policy Implications 
The results in our model without school-level controls largely confirm our hypotheses. 
The relationship between the level of tuition required of private schools and their decision to 
participate in a voucher program is negative. The results in our model with school-level controls 
also show a negative relationship, however statistical significance only remains for the negative 
effect of tuition levels on participation in the D.C. and Indiana programs. This is likely because 
controlling for school-level characteristics diminishes our treatment of interest if these 
characteristics are reflected in the cost of attending the school. The effect of cohort enrollment, a 
potential indicator of quality, on school participation decisions appears to vary across the three 
locations. In D.C. the effect of enrollment on participation is positive but not statistically 
significant. In Indiana it is negative but not significant. The relationship between cohort 
enrollment and school participation is negative and statistically significant in Louisiana. Higher-
enrollment private schools are much less interested in participating in the school choice program 
in Louisiana than in Indiana or DC, where cohort enrollment levels do not clearly factor into the 
decision.  
Our analysis of Great Schools review scores shows a negative, though statistically 
insignificant, relationship with program participation, likely due to the small variation on Great 
Schools Review scores among the schools. Catholic schools consistently display a significantly 
higher likelihood of participating in school choice programs, after controlling for school 
characteristics.Private schools in D.C. and Louisiana have a significantly smaller likelihood of 
participating in voucher programs than in Indiana, with the least participation in Louisiana, 





This report contributes to the existing literature on understanding the supply side of 
voucher programs: what kind of schools are receiving the voucher students, and what school 
characteristics predict the likelihood of participating in a private school choice program. We 
demonstrate a simple model of rational decision-making to allow us to illustrate what kinds of 
private schools will and will not choose to participate in a private school choice program. Our 
report contributes to an improved understanding of the supply side of voucher programs that can 
assist engineers of new and existing school choice programs. In particular, policymakers should 
be cautious about the consequences of attempting to control the quality of schools within a 
voucher program. In attempting to control quality through regulation, decision-makers may 
inadvertently limit the number of high-quality choices available to disadvantaged students across 
the United States. A second key lesson is that the effects of proxy measures of school quality on 
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2. Regulations for Participants 
Additional Benefits 
1. Additional Financing Support (Voucher 
Amount) 
2. Decreased per-pupil expenditures  
3.	Enhanced Social Responsibility 
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Costs > Benefits 
- Not eager for money 
- Higher regulatory burden 
Participants 
Costs < Benefits 
- Need the money 
- Less regulatory burden 
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Decision 







Table 1: Participation Costs and Benefits for Each Voucher Program 
Feature D.C. Indiana Louisiana 
Date Enacted 2004 2011 2008 
Average Funding Relative to Public School 47% 42% 54% 
Eligibility Rate 35% 54% 20% 
Testing Requirement Y Y Y 
Open-Admissions Process   Y 
Financial Reporting Y Y Y 
Parental Copay Prohibited   Y 
Teacher Requirements Y   
Ranking of State Laws for School Choice Voucher 
Programs (Center for Education Reform,2014) 
B A C 
Regulatory Burden Score Ranking (Stuit & Doan, 
2013). 
7 2 5 
Notes: Ranking of State Laws for School Choice Voucher Programs ranges from A to F with A indicating the lowest 
regulatory burden and F indicating the highest regulatory burden. Ranking of Regulatory Burden Score is taken from 
Table4 in Stuit & Doan (2013). School choice regulations: Red tape or red herring. Washington, D.C.: Thomas B. 
Fordham Institute. It ranges from 1 to 13 with 1 indicating the highest regulatory burden and 13 indicating the 
lowest regulatory burden. 
 
 
Table 2: School Characteristics Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Overall Tuition ($1,000) 515 7.264 6.102 1.900 49.666 
    D.C.  51 18.600 12.246 3.255 49.666 
    Indiana  224 6.101 2.929 1.90 20.645 
    Louisiana  240 5.941 3.202 2.000 19.660 
Great School Review Score  483 4.186 0.698 1 5 
    D.C.  40 4.276 0.561 2.923 5 
    Indiana  221 4.293 0.749 1 5 
    Louisiana  222 4.063 0.648 1 5 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100) 665 0.351 0.420 0.010 2.828 
Catholic School 667 0.496 0.500 0 1 
Elementary-Only School 667 0.657 0.475 0 1 
Library or Media Center 667 1.895 0.307 1 2 
Percent of Minority Students 661 0.284 0.317 0 100 







Table 3: Sample Descriptive Analysis 	
 
Overall D.C. Indiana Louisiana 
(1)  Count of Participating Schools 492 47 314 131 
(2)  Count of PSS Schools (2013-14) 667 54 329 284 
(3)  Matched Participating Schools 366 42 231 93 
       Participating Schools Match Rate= (3)/(1) 74% 89% 74% 71% 
(4)  Program Participation Rate=(3)/(2) 54.87% 77.78% 70.21% 32.75% 
(5)  Count of Schools with Tuition Rate 515 51 224 240 
       Tuition Match Rate = (5)/(2) 77.21% 94.44% 68.09% 84.51% 
(6)  Count of Schools with Great Schools Review Score 483 40 221 222 





Table 4: School Quality on Participation Decision, across states  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revenue (Ln) -0.021  -0.02  0.043  0.006  
 
(0.039)  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.038)  
Tuition ($1,000)  -0.009*  -0.012**  -0.006  0 
 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100)  -0.057  -0.093  -0.021  -0.114 
 
 (0.087)  (0.106)  (0.078)  (0.076) 
Elementary School   0.052 0.025 0.054 0.018 -0.124 -0.12 
 
  (0.065) (0.066) (0.063) (0.068) (0.084) (0.077) 
Secondary School   0.047 0.109 0.019 0.052 -0.171* -0.072 
 
  (0.097) (0.118) (0.092) (0.130) (0.102) (0.117) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours   0.1 0.06 0.053 0.034 0.044 0.011 
 
  (0.070) (0.078) (0.068) (0.075) (0.054) (0.049) 
Has Library or Library Media Center     -0.009 0.09 -0.075 0.005 
 
    (0.087) (0.084) (0.115) (0.123) 
Percentage of Minority Student     0.458** 0.314 0.410*** 0.335*** 
 
    (0.222) (0.219) (0.113) (0.102) 
Catholic School       0.269*** 0.267*** 
 
      (0.069) (0.064) 
DC -0.142** -0.091* -0.127* -0.068 -0.441*** -0.270* -0.249* -0.175 
 
(0.064) (0.055) (0.070) (0.044) (0.144) (0.141) (0.134) (0.111) 
LA -0.511*** -0.537*** -0.479*** -0.542*** -0.730*** -0.697*** -0.644 -0.596 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.070) (0.072) (0.158) (0.155) (0.400) (0.401) 
Constant 1.278** 1.027*** 0.61 0.613 0.012 0.569 0.636 0.762* 
 
(0.520) (0.017) (0.678) (0.537) (0.547) (0.493) (0.615) (0.417) 
 
        
N 514 514 511 511 509 509 509 509 
Adjusted R Squared 0.249 0.513 0.26 0.528 0.306 0.548 0.346 0.581 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
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(0.01)  (0.009) 








(0.09)  (0.122) 
Elementary School -0.183 -0.224 -0.216 -0.223 -0.076 -0.078 
 
(0.140) (0.150) (0.147) (0.16) (0.124) (0.105) 
Secondary School -0.134 -0.129 -0.25 -0.072 -0.14 0.049 
 
(0.166) (0.181) (0.163) (0.17) (0.156) (0.164) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours -0.05 0.015 0.17 0.198 0.019 0.022 
 
(0.079) (0.056) (0.119) (0.13) (0.065) (0.065) 
Has Library or Library Media Center 0.185 0.314 -0.182 -0.105 0.043 0.026 
 
(0.274) (0.239) (0.168) (0.13) (0.198) (0.193) 
Percentage of Minority Student 0.032 -0.202 -0.042 -0.117 0.617*** 0.553*** 
 
(0.193) (0.191) (0.177) (0.13) (0.155) (0.137) 
Catholic School 0.085 -0.112 0.401*** 0.411*** 0.210** 0.242** 
 
(0.114) (0.122) (0.108) (0.11) (0.105) (0.098) 
Constant 1.649**  0.641 -0.322 -0.29 0.336 -0.273 
 
(0.627) (0.626) (1.182) (1.01) (0.896) (0.513) 
     
  
N 47 47 223 223 240 240 
Adjusted R Squared 0.081 0.194 0.283 0.314 0.235 0.53 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 




Table 6: Linear Probability of Great Schools Review Score on Participation Decision  
 
Overall D.C. Indiana Louisiana Overall D.C. Indiana Louisiana 
 
Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant Participant 
Great Schools Review Score 
(Weighted) -0.051 -0.051 0.003 -0.118 -0.018 -0.188 0.024 -0.039 
 
(0.051) (0.138) (0.042) (0.109) (0.612) (0.129) (0.583) (0.634) 
Catholic 
    
0.276*** 0.206* 0.315*** 0.284*** 
     
(0.000) (0.079) (0.005) 0.000  
Elementary School 
    
-0.118 0.07 -0.157 -0.146 
     
(0.128) (0.708) (0.203) (0.129) 
Secondary School 
    
-0.173* -0.036 -0.068 -0.315* 
     
(0.078) (0.857) (0.631) (0.050) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 
    
-0.04 -0.13 -0.066 -0.026 
     
(0.717) (0.566) (0.448) (0.906) 
Has Library or Library Media Center 
    
0.347*** 0.091 0.016 0.582*** 
     
(0.001) (0.605) (0.882) (0.000) 
Percentage of Minority Student 
    
0.032 -0.036 0.155 0.043 
     
(0.581) (0.696) (0.224) (0.621) 
D.C. -0.156*** 
   
-0.485*** 
   
 
(0.006) 
   
(0.000) 
   LA -1.037*** 
   
-1.066*** 
   
 
(0.037) 
   
(0.000) 
   Constant 1.222*** 1.067* 0.983*** 0.422 1.244*** 1.067* 0.008 0.44 
 
(0.224) (0.590) (0.212) (0.392) (0.231) (0.590) (0.211) (0.395) 
N 478 40 217 221 475 38 216 221 
R Squared 0.575 0.006 0.518 0.394 0.643 0.21 0.623 0.52 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 







Appendix 1: The Effect of School Quality on Participation Decision Using Linear Probability Model, by states 
DC  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




















































-0.056 -0.096 -0.142 -0.239 -0.183 -0.224 
   
(0.127) (0.138) (0.127) (0.151) (0.140) (0.150) 
Secondary School 
  
0.016 -0.022 -0.076 -0.173 -0.134 -0.129 
   
(0.160) (0.158) (0.146) (0.173) (0.166) (0.181) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 
  
-0.048 -0.027 -0.051 0.003 -0.05 0.015 
   
(0.068) (0.047) (0.083) (0.051) (0.079) (0.056) 
Has Library or Library Media Center 
    
0.2 0.273 0.185 0.314 
     
(0.250) (0.246) (0.274) (0.239) 
Percentage of Minority Student 
    
0.079 -0.158 0.032 -0.202 
     
(0.235) (0.149) (0.193) (0.191) 
Catholic School 
      
0.085 -0.112 
       
(0.114) (0.122) 
Constant 1.091** 0.839*** 1.966*** 1.178*** 1.514** 0.721 1.649**  0.641 
 
(0.524) (0.070) (0.725) (0.413) (0.573) (0.622) (0.627) (0.626) 
         N 51 51 49 49 47 47 47 47 
Adjusted R Squared 0.004 0.034 0.037 0.104 0.069 0.18 0.081 0.194 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 






 INDIANA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















































0.039 0.038 0.048 0.047 -0.216 -0.223 
   
(0.114) (0.13) (0.115) (0.137) (0.147) (0.162) 
Secondary School 
  
-0.016 0.125 -0.017 0.159 -0.25 -0.072 
   
(0.116) (0.129) (0.127) (0.141) (0.163) (0.168) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 0.174* 0.217* 0.178* 0.223* 0.17 0.198 
   
(0.103) (0.127) (0.100) (0.125) (0.119) (0.128) 
Has Library or Library Media Center 
  
-0.105 0.007 -0.182 -0.105 
     
(0.165) (0.158) (0.168) (0.126) 
Percentage of Minority Student 
  
-0.047 -0.184 -0.042 -0.117 
     
(0.208) (0.2) (0.177) (0.13) 
Catholic School 
      
0.401*** 0.411*** 
       
(0.108) (0.109) 
Constant -0.069 1.057*** -1.298 -0.482 -1.149 -0.541 -0.322 -0.29 
 
(0.438) (0.029) (0.840) (0.911) (0.813) (1.051) (1.182) (1.011) 
         N 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
Adjusted R Squared 0.103 0.088 0.108 0.109 0.099 0.106 0.283 0.314 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 






 LOUISIANA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Revenue (Ln) -0.120**   -0.116**   0.001   -0.045   
 







































0.011 0.028 0.066 0.048 -0.076 -0.078 
   
(0.087) (0.092) (0.084) (0.088) (0.124) (0.105) 
Secondary School 
  
-0.026 0.237 0.013 0.151 -0.14 0.049 
   
(0.149) (0.202) (0.136) (0.216) (0.156) (0.164) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 
  
0.076 0.092 0.02 0.037 0.019 0.022 
   
(0.101) (0.109) (0.071) (0.074) (0.065) (0.065) 
Has Library or Library Media Center 
    
0.089 0.114 0.043 0.026 
     
(0.157) (0.156) (0.198) (0.193) 
Percentage of Minority Student 
    
0.678*** 0.554*** 0.617*** 0.553*** 
     
(0.161) (0.142) (0.155) (0.137) 
Catholic School 
      
0.210** 0.242** 
       
(0.105) (0.098) 
Constant 1.703** 0.106*** 1.145* -0.554 -0.354 -0.465 0.336 -0.273 
 
(0.848) (0.039) (0.609) (0.696) (0.597) (0.415) (0.896) (0.513) 
         N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Adjusted R Squared 0.112 0.434 0.102 0.45 0.213 0.506 0.235 0.53 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 




Appendix 2: The Effect of School Quality on Participation Decision Using Probit Model, full model 
 







Participant  Participant Participant 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 







(0.030)  (0.050)    (0.024) 
 
(0.046) 















Average Grade Cohort Enrollment (100)  -0.128 
 













Elementary School -0.121* -0.144* -0.213 -0.144 -0.201*** -0.272** -0.091 -0.099 
 
(0.069) (0.074) (0.147) (0.107) -0.062 (0.111) (0.107) (0.091) 
Secondary School -0.169* -0.086 -0.142 0.092 (0.010) 0.12 -0.151 0.029 
 
(0.086) (0.120) (0.155) (0.141) -0.123 (0.134) (0.131) (0.132) 
Length of School Day In Total Hours 0.025 0.022 -0.05 0.023 0.268*** 0.372*** -0.023 -0.016 
 
(0.049) (0.071) (0.046) (0.037) -0.081 (0.094) (0.063) (0.064) 
Has Library or Library Media Center -0.002 0.015 0.166 0.286**  (0.094) -0.013 0.057 0.042 
 
(0.118) (0.104) (0.169) (0.129) -0.078 (0.091) (0.159) (0.151) 
Percentage of Minority Student 0.465*** 0.393** -0.024 -0.084 0.097  0.037 0.715*** 0.618*** 
 
(0.102) (0.160) (0.137) (0.168) -0.127 (0.120) (0.127) (0.124) 
Catholic School 0.298*** 0.336*** 0.064 -0.186*   0.569*** 0.604*** 0.248*** 0.290*** 
 
(0.060) (0.078) (0.089) (0.099) (0.075) (0.057) (0.089) (0.079) 
DC 0.132 0.167 
    
  
 (0.200) (0.108)       
LA -0.238 -0.234**       
 (0.286) (0.109)       
         
N 317 317 47 47 111 111 159 159 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. 
Notes: All models use city fixed effects. Robust standard error in parentheses, clustered at city level. 
